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Abstract
Participatory sensing system (PSS) is an emerging ﬁeld of research where the fundamental idea is to employ the autonomous agents
(in this paper humans) carrying smart devices, as a virtual sensor for collecting and transmitting information. The most grinding
work is to motivate the human agents carrying smart devices in the data collecting process. For motivating the human agents,
auction theory has played a central role with a framework to incentivize the agents in the PSS. In this line, works so far have
mainly considered that there are several human agents to sell the data, and one data collecting centre to buy the data. In this paper,
we propose a truthful mechanism in an online double auction environment that addresses the situation where multiple sellers and
multiple buyers are present in the PSS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst truthful mechanism in double auction setting.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Eleventh International Multi-Conference on Information
Processing-2015 (IMCIP-2015).
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1. Introduction
With the emergence of smart devices, researchers around the communities are trying to utilize the true potential of
the devices not only as a bare communicating device but also as a sensor. Physical deployment of sensors in collecting
data to take several decisions, may not be cost effective and may be ﬁxed for a particular application. Because of
this, an alternative model is thriving to commission agents carrying smart devices, as the virtual sensors in the data
collecting process since the smart devices are made with the modern technologies and hardware with a capability
of collecting and transmitting data to some service centres to help them making some particular decisions5,15, 17, 19.
The efﬁcient use of agents equipped with smart phones, in the data collecting process instead of deploying physical
sensors, is commonly termed as participatory sensing system (PSS). In this paper, by agents we mean the human
agents. However the term agent may be considered in the general sense also. It has been perceived that if the data are
collected by human agents, the PSS may face a problem in terms of agents’ participation5,7, 9.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) First time in PSS the multiple sellers-multiple buyers case
in the double auction setting is addressed. As multiple sellers and multiple buyers are present, it is natural to model
the PSS with the double auction. 2) A general framework, in the online environment, is proposed when the multiple
sellers and multiple buyers are present. 3) First time a truthful mechanism is proposed motivated by2 in the ODA
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environment for the PSS. 4) A substantial amount of simulation is done to verify the performance of our proposed
algorithm with the existing algorithm. In static environment, where all agents are present before processing the agents,
the existing algorithm is the McAfee double auction (MDA). The MDA, in our paper, is adapted directly in each
of the auction rounds (note that in online environment multiple rounds of auctions are executed) and termed as
MDA-variant (MDA-V). ThisMDA-V is taken as the benchmark (existing) scheme with which our proposed algorithm
is compared.
It is assumed that the agents are rational that is, they try to maximize their own proﬁt. The proposed scheme in the
PSS is given by considering that the service provider has sufﬁcient budget. The limited budget case with a quality
constraint will be considered in our future work. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, related
works are mentioned. In section 3, Themodel is presented. Some preliminaries are discussed in section 4. The proposed
algorithm and its analysis is given in section 5. In section 6, further analysis of the proposed algorithm is presented.
The simulation results are given in section 7. Conclusions and future works are given in section 8.
2. Related works
Since its inceptions, several ideas are proposed for stimulating the agents by providing incentive. The selected
winner(s) will be given some ﬁxed price, is proposed in14. In PSS multiple sellers are present and hence it is a
potential candidate that is to be modelled with reverse auction13. In9 a reverse auction is addressed where each of the
k number of winning sellers is paid its bid price. As PSS is emerging as a general tool, new innovative schemes are
proposed recently for providing incentives to the agents. See6,8, 12, 19 for some recent ingenious incentive schemes.
In7 one interesting reverse auction based mechanism is proposed, by giving stress on location information and budget
constraints, using the payment scheme of9. Some truthful mechanisms for the PSS are proposed in4,10, 20 where the
main idea is to prevent manipulation in the bidding process. The schemes stated above did not consider the quality of
the data. Some quality adaptive schemes are proposed in1,16, 18, 20. In16,18, 20, the quality of the collected data and the
bid prices of the participating agents were not combined to prepare the valuation of the agents. In1 an attempt is made
in that direction. Recently to recruit more number of agents in the PSS, privacy preservation is becoming an important
metric as the agents may be reluctant that his private information associated with the data being leaked. Most recent
works for this line are addressed in3,5, 11, 16. However when multiple sellers and multiple buyers are present in the
PSS, a double auction environment is obvious and it is interesting to note that the agents appear in the PSS are online
in nature. So the double auction environment is immediately extended into the online double auction (ODA) setting.
The difﬁcult challenge in the ODA is to provide the truthful auction. In the above mentioned literature, the PSS is not
addressed in ODA environment. In the current paper, PSS is addressed in presence of multiple buyers.
3. Problem Formulation
In this paper, for the online double auction (ODA), n sellers and m buyers are available. The sellers and buyers
are synonymously called agents. The sellers are the agents that are present in the market with smart phones, to sell
the collected information. There are several competing organizations who can buy the information. They are termed
as buyers. The set of sellers is denoted by S = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the set of buyers is denoted by B = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Each of the sellers and buyers can appear and depart dynamically. All the sellers and the buyers are not present
simultaneously. If we divide the total duration of the ODA into some discrete time periods T = {0, 1, . . . , }, in each
discrete time t ∈ T some subset of the buyers and some subset of the sellers will be present. In each discrete time
t ∈ T , the ODA tries to match the buyers with the sellers with a condition that one buyer is matched with one seller
only. The matching of a buyer with a seller is called a transaction. Because of the online nature of the problem, an
agent has to report his or her (henceforth his) arrival time, departure time, and the valuation price for the transaction.
Let us call all these information the type of an agent. Formally the type of an agent can be written as γˆi = {aˆi , dˆi , vˆi },
where aˆi is the arrival time (ﬁrst time he is in the market), dˆi is the departure time (uptil dˆi , he is in the market and
after that he will no longer be in the market), and vˆi is the valuation. Further to distinguish the type of the sellers and
the buyers throughout the paper, the type of each seller will be denoted by γˆ si , the type of each buyer will be denoted
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by γˆ bi . The valuation price is the function expressed in terms of the bid values and whether the agent wins or not.
The valuation function for the i th buyer is deﬁned as:
vˆbi = wˆbi (1)
The valuation function for the i th seller is deﬁned as:
vˆsi = −wˆsi (2)
Here wˆbi is the reported bid price of the i th buyer for purchasing the information from the sellers and wˆ
s
i is the
reported ask price of the i th seller for selling the information to the buyers. The valuation vector, henceforth,
vˆb = {vˆb1 , vˆb2 , . . . , vˆbm} will be referred as the bids and vˆs = {vˆs1, vˆs2, . . . , vˆsn} will be referred as the asks. The type
γˆ si = {2, 4,−10} depicts the fact that the agent reports his arrival time at 2’O clock, he will leave the market at
4’O clock and the agent wants to sell the information with the value −10 with his ask price 10. Similarly γˆ bi can be
interpreted. Depending on the types available, a DA is run in each discrete time interval. In the example of the type
γˆ si = {2, 4,−10}, each discrete time interval is taken as an hour. It may be any amount of time, depending on the
designer (say for example 15 minutes). Initially some agents are available and in future some more agents can join
dynamically. The types of all the agents except the i th one, is denoted by γˆ b−i (for buyers), and γˆ s−i (for sellers). For
notational convenience, the type of an agent is denoted by γˆ = (aˆi , dˆi , vˆi ). This is the reported type of an agent and
includes all possible reported types. To distinguish between the true type and all other reported type we introduce the
notation γ that will indicate the true type of an agent. So, γ = {ai , di , vi } will indicate the true type of an agent. The
utility of the proposed ODA is the measure of the gain that is achieved by the agents by participating in the system.
The utility i of the seller is the payment he receives (denoted by δsi ) minus the true value declared by him, where δsi is
deﬁned as δsi : T → R. The utility of the losers will be 0 for both buyers and sellers. The utility of the winning seller
is deﬁned as
usi = δsi − |vsi | (3)
The utility of the buyer is deﬁned by the true valuation of the buyer minus the payment he pays (denoted by δbi ) to the
auctioneer, where δbi is deﬁned as δ
b
i : T → R. The utility of the buyer is formally deﬁned as:
ubi = vbi − δbi (4)
4. Preliminaries
4.1 Assumptions
In this paper some realistic assumptions are made. The ﬁrst assumption is about the limited misreport criteria.
In this limited misreport criteria, an agent will not report his arrival time aˆi before his actual (true) arrival time ai .
Similarly an agent will not report his departure time dˆi after his true departure di . The agents can misreport within
their arrival-departure window. This assumption is realistic, considering the fact that aˆi ≤ ai indicates that an agent is
announcing his presence before he is actually present in the spot and dˆi ≥ di conveys that, an agent is announcing his
presence when he has already departed the spot. The agents are self-interested and rational, so they try to maximize
their own individual gain. The type of each agent is his private information that is not known to the other agents and to
the auctioneer. Each DA runs in some discrete time interval. The gap between the arrival time and the departure time
for all agents will be kept reasonable that conﬁrms the true dynamic behaviour of the agents. Formally it can be said
that for each agent di − x ≤ ai where x is the gap we are talking about. If this x is small then the agents are truly
dynamic.
4.2 Salient properties of the proposed ODA
Before going to present the actual algorithm in the next section some relevant properties of the proposed ODA are
discussed below:
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Truthfulness: This property ensures the fact that the agents can’t gain by misreporting their type. In other words,
revealing the true type is the best response rather than any possible lie. The truthfulness property can be formally
deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1. An ODA is truthful, if the utilities of reporting the true type proﬁle (γ b, γ s) be (ubi , usi ) and the utilities
of reporting any other type proﬁle ( γˆ b = γ b, γˆ s = γ s) be (uˆb, uˆs) then we have ub ≥ uˆb and us ≥ uˆs .
Individual rationality (IR): By this property of the ODA, it is ensured that no winning seller is paid less than his ask
and no winning buyer pays more than his bids.
Deﬁnition 2. An ODA is (ex-post) individual rational if for wsi ≤ δsi and δbi ≤ wbi .
Budget balance (BB): In this proposed ODA a mediator, called a central auctioneer, is present to make valid (buy,
sell) pairs for having all the transactions possible. The BB property is for the auctioneer and can be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 3. An ODA is budget balanced if for the reported type proﬁle (γˆ b, γˆ s ), we have∑i δbi − iδsi ≥ 0.
4.3 McAfee’s double auction (MDA)
For designing the truthful mechanism in static environment the standard algorithm that is existing is the MDA2.
MDA plug buyers with the sellers from among the available agents by ﬁnding e with e = argmaxe(vbe + vse ≥ 0).
The ﬁrst (e − 1) buyers and the ﬁrst (e − 1) sellers will have the valid transactions that is, these are the
winning agents. The buyers who will lose, will be paying 0 and the sellers who will lose, will be paid 0. For
example say the buyer’s valuations are: (12, 8, 10, 14) and seller’s valuations are: (−3,−2,−8,−10). The buyer’s
valuations and seller’s valuations are sorted in non-increasing order. The least proﬁtable transaction is found using
e = argmaxe((vbe + vse) ≥ 0); in this case e = 3. The number of winning seller − buyer pairs are 2 according to2.
Each of the winning buyers will pay 6 and each of the winning sellers will be paid 4. An important issue is that the
McAfee’s rule in static environment may not be directly adaptable in online environment. The main difﬁculty is that,
in online environment one agent can chose his competitor within his arrival-departure window. It can be easily shown
by a counter example that agent may gain by misreporting his type. Due to the space limitation the example is omitted.
In MDA the eth transaction is sacriﬁced. However, depending on the valuation of the (e+1)th agent, this transaction
may also be considered as a valid transaction without violating the truthfulness property. In the above example, the
average of the valuation of the (e + 1)th agents is p˙ = (8 + | − 10|)/2 = 9. Now observe that vbe ≥ p˙ and |vse | ≤ p˙.
If this condition is satisﬁed, the eth transaction can also be considered as a valid transaction. In this paper for the
proposed algorithm, the idea of the extended MDA is used in deciding the payment of the agents.
5. Proposed ODA
After extending the MDA, in this section an online truthful double auction is proposed based on2. In2, an interesting
payment function is explored that plays a central role for the ODA to be truthful. This is the ﬁrst time a truthful ODA in
the PSS is proposed that was the most challenging hurdle in this paper and this is proposed by adapting the idea of the
payment function of2. One of the obvious motivations to provide a truthful mechanism is that, it is easy for an agent
to tender the bid or the ask price without considering what the other agents are doing, the system equilibrium is easy
to predict for a designer, and the social welfare maximization can be achieved that is the maximum willingness to pay
or to buy can be elicited from the agents. Allocation and the payment functions are at the heart of the proposed ODA.
The allocation and payment rules are heavily dependent on the payment function. The payment function determines
the payment of each agent in the period t ∈ T . This is deﬁned as, with the idea of2:
δi (t) = max
τ
{pτ (· )} where, τ ∈ {dˆi − x, . . . , t} (5)
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at t = 9
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Fig. 1. Payment function calculation for an arbitrary buyer at t = 9.
and pτ (· ) is deﬁned as: pτ : T ×−i → R The function is calculated based on the gap x that is set for ∀i . Each agent
is aligned with the agents that are present at each discrete time interval τ ∈ {dˆi − x, . . . , t} and the payment of that
agent is calculated. The maximum of all these payments is taken as the payment of that agent. If the agent wins in the
period t , his payment will be this maximum payment. The calculation of pτ (· ) is agent independent that is, during the
payment calculation of the i th agent, that agent’s valuation is taken outside the market. Now the extended McAfee’s
rule can be adapted in the proposed ODA by deﬁning the pbτ and psτ as follows:
pbτ (τ, γˆ−i ) =
{
p˙b, if p˙b ≤ vbe and p˙b ≥ |vse |
vbe Otherwise
(6)
Here, p˙b = (vbe+1 + |vse+1|)/2. Again, vbe is the last clearing bid value, and vse is the last clearing ask value when
the i th buyer, and the seller with the maximum ask, is out of the market. The maximum ask is taken so that a safe
transaction occurs if the least proﬁtable transaction, by the payment rule, happens to be a valid one. In a similar manner
the payment to be made to the sellers can be deﬁned as:
psτ (τ, γˆ−i ) =
{
− p˙s, if − p˙s ≤ vse and − p˙s ≥ −vbe
vse Otherwise
(7)
Let us take an example to illustrate the price function computation of any arbitrary agent i . The example is shown
in Fig. 1 and 2. In Fig. 1(a), 4 buyers and 4 sellers are present. For each of the agents, the payment function can be
calculated. The bids and asks are sorted as shown in Fig. 1(b). After sorting, the buyer that is present in index number
2 with the valuation 8 will be used to demonstrate the payment calculation. For agent i = 2, say (aˆi , dˆ i ) = (9, 11).
According to the rule, vb2 = 8 and vs1 = −2 will be out of the market that is shown in Fig. 1(c). The last clearing bid and
ask is shown in Fig. 1(d). Based on equation 7, the payment is calculated at t = 9 and this payment pbi (9, γˆ−i ) = 5.
Similarly, by the equation 6, the payment of the agent at t = 8 is calculated and it is pbi (8, γˆ−i ) = 6. Both the payments
are shown in Fig. 1(e) and 2(e). Based on equation 6, the ﬁnal payment δbi (t), if he wins, is shown in Fig. 2(f). The
computation is shown for a buyer. Similarly the payment of any arbitrary seller can be computed at t ∈ T . For the case
of a seller, the valuation of that i th seller and the bidder with the maximum bid value, will be taken outside the market.
Then with the equation 6 and 7, the payment to be paid to that seller is calculated.
5.1 Rule of the auction
Once the payment function is deﬁned, the rule of the proposed ODA can be framed as follows: 1) At any time t ∈ T ,
identify the bids and the asks of those who are appearing for the ﬁrst time. For those agents, calculate the payment by
the following equations 5, 6 or 7 for ∀τ ∈ {dˆi − k, . . . , t}. If δbi (t) ≤ vbe , that buyer is considered as active otherwise
he will be inactive and no longer be considered as a participant in the auction. Similarly a seller will be considered as
active if δsi (t) ≤ vse , otherwise he will be inactive from now on. Those who are not appearing for the ﬁrst time, but
still are active, calculate only pi (t, γˆ−i ) and update δi (t) = max{δi (t − 1), pi(t, γˆ−i )}. 2) An updated bid vector is
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Fig. 2. Payment function calculation for an arbitrary buyer at t = 8
prepared based on the non-increasing order of δbi (t) and an updated ask vector is prepared based on the non-increasing
order of δsi (t). In actual implementation for the simulation work, the bid and ask vector are implemented with Python
list structure. 2) Starting from the top of the bid list and ask list, the bids and asks are matched based on the condition
δbi (t) + δsi (t) ≥ 0. The payment to be paid to a matched seller is δsi = |δsi (t)| and a buyer pays δbi = δbi (t)
5.2 Proposed algorithm
Combining the payment function and rule of the ODA, the proposed algorithm is formally given in Algorithm 1.
As the algorithm is proposed in the online environment, the algorithm is termed as Online truthful double auction
for participatory sensing (OTDAPS). Henceforth, Algorithm 1 and OTDAPS will be used interchangeably. First the
OTDAPS takes some initial bids and asks. This is given by the ‘input’ lines. In line 2 and 3, the payment sets are
initialized to φ. In line 4, the actual for loop begins. The loop iterates up to T . In line 5, the payment of each individual
buyer, if it is not made inactive, is determined and stored in B p and similarly by line 6, the payment to be made to each
individual seller, if it is not made inactive, is determined and the result is stored in Ap. The bids and asks are sorted
by any standard sorting algorithm in non increasing order of their payment B p and Ap . This sorting process is done in
line 7 and 8. After sorting, the valid transactions are made, starting from the top of the bid list and ask list, comprising
the condition δbi (t) − δsi (t) ≥ 0. These transactions are made by line 9. With the transactions available in T ALOC ,
all the payments of the corresponding agent is stored in P . The payments of all agents of all round so far, is stored in
P∗. These two cases are implemented by line 10 and 11. Already selected agents are deleted by line 12 and 13 from
Bb and As . In actual implementation some attribute was set to −1 to indicate that an agent is no longer their in the
auction. This is done like this as to compute the other agent’s payment in future, this bid or the ask may be required.
Line 14 and 15 takes new buyers and sellers that is quite natural in the online environment. These bids are merged
with the Bb and As in line 16 and 17. Final allocation of each iteration is stored in ALOC and it is done in line 18.
5.3 Time complexity
Payment calculation may be performed, in each iteration, on O(n) agents and for each agent O(k) number of
payments calculation are to be computed. Here n is the total number of agents that may be present altogether in
all auction rounds. So a total of O(kn) number of payments calculation are made in each iteration. Each payment
calculation can take O(n2) time. Hence the payments calculation in each iteration takes O(kn3). Sorting the payment
of O(n) agents takes O(n log n) time. Allocation of O(n) agents take O(n) time. Other statements take O(1) time.
So, in each iteration the running time is O(kn3 + n log n) which we can write asymptotically as O(kn3). As k < n,
we can say the algorithm is running in polynomial time.
6. Further Analysis of the OTDAPS
In this section we have proved several theorems associated with the proposed OTDAPS. Due to the space constraint,
the detailed proof of the theorems is not given. However a sketch is given for each of the proofs.
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Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. In the OTDAPS auctioneer gains nk expected number of times.
Proof. The OTDAPS is modeled by extending the McAfee’s double auction. If the last (bid-ask) pair is not sacriﬁced,
δbi = δsi . In that case
∑
i δ
b
i −
∑
i δ
s
i = 0 and hence auctioneer gains no proﬁt. However, the OTDAPS is performed in
online environment and hence the auctioneer makes proﬁt in expectation.
Let Xi be the random variable that is denoting the fact that in the i th auction the last (bid-ask) pair is sacriﬁced.
Further assume that X be the random variable that counts the number of pairs are sacriﬁced. By taking the
expectation of X , it can be easily shown that the expected number of pairs are sacriﬁced for a total of n number of
auctions are nk . Here the probability of being sacriﬁced is taken as 1/k. 
Theorem 2. The OTDAPS is IR and BB.
Proof. For the IR property, ubi ≥ 0 and usi ≥ 0. In this case we have to show ubi = vbi −δbi ≥ 0 and usi = δsi −|vsi | ≥ 0.
We can conclude this is true by referring the property of an agent to be active.
For proving the budget-balanced property it is to be shown that
∑
i δ
b
i −
∑
i δ
s
i ≥ 0. When a match occurs in the
OTDAPS, the condition that is to be satisﬁed is δbi (t) ≥ |δsi (t)|. Hence the BB condition follows. 
Theorem 3. The OTDAPS is truthful.
Proof. The three main ingredients of the proof are: 1) Payment function is agent independent, 2) Limited misreport,
and 3) A max operator is used to calculate the payment. When the payment is calculated for an agent, he is taken out of
the market. Hence the payment function calculation is agent independent. Due to this fact misreporting his valuation
shall not provide any gain to an agent. Due to the limited misreport criteria, an agent can misreport his arrival time or
the departure time only within his arrival-departure window. Say the agent is a buyer. If an agent misreports his arrival
time, his arrival will be delayed and due to the payment function he will be aligned with more number of auction
rounds. Because of that, by the max operator his payment to the auctioneer may be more and the utility will be less.
Similar argument is true for the departure time. The sellers’ case can be argued in a similar manner. Hence follows the
theorem. 
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Table 1. Agent’s information.
Agents Distribution Values in range Nature
buyers uniform 11–63 dynamic
seller uniform 11–63 dynamic
7. Simulations and Results
7.1 Simulation set-up
In this paper we have proposed a truthful algorithm in the online double auction environment. The truthful algorithm
as stated earlier is called OTDAPS. The standard truthful algorithm that is available in static environment is theMcAfee
Double Auction (MDA). ThisMDA (extended) is directly adapted in online environment, in each auction round, which
we call MDA-Variant (MDA-V), and is taken as the benchmark algorithm for comparing our algorithm. However, this
is to be noted that MDA-V is not truthful and is vulnerable to manipulation.
As shown in Table 1, for the simulation purpose, the nature of both the agents is dynamic. The bids and asks
are generated by a uniform probability distribution. The bidders’ valuations are in the range 11–63 and the sellers’
valuations are in the same range. The unit of the bid valuations is taken as $. An agent, along with the bid value, submit
his arrival and departure time. So the type of an agent is comprised of three parameters. These three parameters play
crucial role for the simulation results of this paper.
7.1.1 Performance metrics
The performance of the OTDAPS is measured from the perspective of the two metrics: 1) Number of transactions
and 2) Payment made. For the case of the number of transactions, the simulation is performed to see the impact
of increasing the number of agents and the gap, on the number of transactions. Here the gap refers the maximum
allowable difference of the arrival and departure time of any agent. Another important direction of performance
measurement, that is used in this paper, is to analyse the payment of the agents with respect to the number of
participating agents. As the benchmark scheme is vulnerable to manipulation, two cases are considered for measuring
the performance of the benchmark scheme and the proposed scheme. The two cases are: 1) when everybody is truthful.
2) considering the non-truthful behaviour in the MDA-V.
For the second case, several sub cases are possible. All agents or some fraction of the agents may vary their
valuations from the actual valuations. With a simple calculation it can be shown that the expected number of agents
that could vary is n/2, where n is the number of agents and the probability that they could vary their valuations is 1/2.
Another observation is that, the agents may vary a small amount, large amount or may be an amount which is in
between small and large. In our simulation it is considered that all agents may vary 30% from their actual valuation.
7.2 Analysis of the results
Direction 1: With the simulation set up several auctions are run in discrete time interval. The simulations are carried
out 100 times and then the average results are taken as the representative results. For the ﬁrst metric, in the X-axis,
number of agents participating, and the gap are plotted as the case may be. Corresponding number of transactions
occurred during the several run of the auctions are recorded in the Y-axis. In the simulation purpose the upper bound
of the total number of agents is taken as 100. The results in the simulation are obtained keeping the number of auctions
same and considering a particular gap, no matter how many agents are participating. In the simulation, for the case of
agents’ valuation, the term variation and deviation will be used interchangeably. In Fig. 3, an ideal case is considered.
By ideal case we mean, the agents are not priced out during payment calculation and it has been observed that, the
number of transactions in the OTDAPS (denoted by P) are more than the benchmark scheme (denoted by B). In Fig. 4,
the simulation is done in case the agents are truthful for both the proposed and the benchmark algorithm. The number
of transactions are less in the proposed scheme as, due to the equation 6, an agent’s payment is calculated after aligning
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Fig. 8. Payment effect1 Fig. 9. Payment effect2.
him not only in the present but also in the past. For this reason, many agents may be priced out and hence number of
transactions may be less.
However, the MDA-V (denoted as B) is vulnerable to manipulation. The effect of this vulnerability is checked in
Fig. 5. For a representative simulation of the vulnerability, it is considered that the valuation of each seller and buyer
may vary by 25%. For the case of a seller 25% of the actual ask price may be increased and in case of a buyer 25%
of the actual bid price may be decreased. the performance for the proposed scheme is much more promising if this
variation of the bid and ask price of the agents are considered. This result is shown in Fig. 5. In this case the number
of transactions are almost neck-and-neck. Further variation may lead to a substantial improvement in the proposed
scheme. The gap effects on the number of transactions are shown in Fig. 6 and 7. In these ﬁgures the simulations are
carried out by varying the gap and keeping the number of agents ﬁxed. As the gap is increased, more and more agents
may be priced out as they will be aligned in more number of auction rounds. Hence the number of transactions will
decrease as the gap will increase. In Fig. 6, the result is plotted when everybody is truthful in both the algorithms.
In the case of untruthful behaviour the gap effect is plotted in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7, the proposed scheme is much more
promising.
Direction 2: Another direction of performance measurement is the payment made to the agents. As usual the sellers
are paid and the buyers are charged. The results are shown in Fig. 8 and 9. In both the ﬁgures, BB stands for buyers’
payment in the benchmark scheme. Likewise BS stands for sellers’ payment in the benchmark scheme. Similarly PB
and PS are to be interpreted. In Fig. 8 the payment made to the agents is depicted when all the agents are bidding
truthfully in the proposed and as well as in the benchmark scheme. The result in this ﬁgure is intuitive due to the fact
246   Jaya Bhattacharjee et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  54 ( 2015 )  237 – 246 
of the Fig. 4. The payment of the buyers and the sellers is less in case of the proposed scheme. In Fig. 9, the payment
made in either side is calculated by taking the fact of 25% deviation as stated above. In this case the proposed scheme
may be better than the benchmark scheme. From these two ﬁgures it is clear that, in both the existing and proposed
scheme, auctioneer will gain some proﬁt and hence auctioneer will be motivated to participate as a mediator.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, ﬁrst time in the PSS, a truthful double auction format in the online environment is addressed. As the
direct adaptation of the standard McAfee’s double auction in online environment is not truthful, proposing a truthful
double auction was the main challenge. This has been the main contribution of the paper. With the simulation it is
explored when the proposed scheme is better than the benchmark scheme. However, the budget and quality sensitive
cases in this double auction environment is not taken into account. The budget and quality efﬁcient double auction in
the online environment will be our future endeavour.
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